Cost harmonization is said to occur when foreign firms' marginal costs are brought closer or equalized to domestic firms' costs. It can occur for various reasons, ranging from foreign direct investment to falling transport cost and policy changes in the foreign country. In this paper we derive general welfare effects of cost harmonization that can be induced by any of these changes. Assuming Cournot oligopoly, we identify a number of situations in which cost harmonization, whether induced by rising or falling marginal costs for foreign firms, can reduce domestic welfare. We then apply the results to various cases and evaluate policy implications.
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Introduction
Cost harmonization is said to occur when foreign firms' (marginal) costs are brought closer or equalized to those facing domestic rivals. Cost harmonization can occur for various reasons; for example, by falling transport costs, which brings the foreign firms' cost down to the level facing the domes. As another example, suppose that the foreign government dismantles its export subsidy programs. Then, the loss of subsidies raises the foreign firms' costs, thereby closing the cost gap between the foreign and the home firms. In this case, the cost is closed by a rise in the foreign firms' cost.
Cost harmonization can arise in other circumstances, i.e., as a result of tax laws changes in foreign countries or adoption of cost-saving technology by foreign firms. The costharmonizing phenomenon most analyzed in the literature perhaps concerns foreign direct investment (FDI). It is standard in the literature to assume that FDI lowers foreign firms' marginal cost relative to exporting. However, cost-raising FDI is not too uncommon to observe in the real world, as firms often choose to locate to higher-marginal cost countries for various reasons; e.g., to escape from high home country corporate taxes, to avoid future trade conflicts with host countries, to take advantage of FDI inducement measures, which often decrease overhead costs, or simply because FDI results in a sufficient decrease in fixed costs of operation.
A well-known example of cost-raising FDI is demonstrated by the case of Japanese automakers, which initially exported all of their cars to the United States from Japan, where production costs were lower, but which soon moved production in the U.S. to avoid trade barriers present and potential, even though relocation raised their production costs. As these examples show, cost harmonization can occur both when foreign firms' costs rise and when they fall, depending on their initial level relative to that of home firms.
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The objective of the present study is to examine the welfare effect of cost harmonization when firms engage in oligopolistic competition in the domestic market. To motivate our analysis, suppose that harmonization arises from foreign cost falling to the domestic level. Evidently, this intensifies competition, decreasing profit to the domestic firms. However, stiffer competition benefits domestic consumers, so the welfare effect hangs in the balance of these two opposing changes. Suppose that the loss outweighs the benefit, so domestic welfare is decreased. Given this result, then one is tempted to conclude that rising foreign costs in the identical circumstance must increase domestic welfare. However, such a conclusion is erroneous, since domestic welfare can decrease when foreign firms' costs rise. Our objective is therefore not to examine various instances of cost harmonization separately, which has been done in the literature. Rather, our goal is to present the general welfare implications of cost harmonization in a common framework. In particular, we want to identify the conditions under which cost harmonization, whether induced by rising or falling foreign cost, is harmful to domestic welfare.
The remainder of the analysis is organized in four sections. The next section presents the basic model. Section 3 is the main section. Among several results we obtain here, we find that if domestic output share exceeds 40 per cent of industry output, cost harmonization, whether induced by rising or falling foreign cost, can reduce domestic welfare. Section 4 applies the main results of section 3 to various cases and derives policy implications for the domestic country. Section 5 concludes.
Model
Suppose n firms compete in the domestic country, of which n d are domestic and n f are foreign. Let n denote the total number of active firms; i. e., n = n d + n f . All domestic firms face Turning to the domestic market demand, we consider a representative consumer model with quadratic preferences given by U(Q) = Q -Q 2 /2, where Q is industry output. This preference specification yields the inverse domestic market demand given by P = 1 -Q.
Firms are assumed to play a quantity-setting (Cournot) game, with a representative firm i choosing output q i to maximize profit π i = (1-Q -c i )q i . From the first-order conditions of all firms we obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We assume that the values of c d and c f are such that all firms produce positive output in equilibrium at all times. It is straightforward to show that a firm facing marginal cost c d , be it foreign or domestic, has equilibrium output
while a foreign firm facing marginal cost c f has equilibrium output
With n d + x firms producing at the cost c d and n f -x foreign firms producing at the cost c f , aggregate output is
From these expressions the profits to the representative domestic firm is
Given the preferences on our representative consumer, consumer surplus is
Therefore, domestic welfare, comprising domestic consumer surplus and total profits to domestic firms, is given by:
This completes the description of the model.
Welfare effects of cost harmonization
Our strategy is to examine the welfare effect of a change in the number of foreign firms whose costs have changed. Although x is discrete, we find it more convenient to treat x as continuous. This has no serious consequences for our analysis, as we show shortly. Then, W(x),
given at the end of section 2, is differentiable. Therefore, the welfare change from x foreign firms adopting cost c d is given by
In (1) W'(x) measures the marginal welfare impact of cost harmonization, i. e., a welfare change as a small fraction of foreign firm undergoes cost change from c f to c d .
Equation (1) shows that a welfare change hinges on the product of two terms. One is the Differentiating (1) yields the second derivative:
This implies that W(x) is convex in x. Now, the next result is immediate from equations (1) and (2).
The first part of the lemma says that, if W'(0) is positive, domestic welfare is maximized at x = n f . On the other hand, if W'(0) is negative, then lemma 1B and 1C imply that domestic welfare is at its maximum either at x = 0 or x = n f . These observations immediately yield the next result.
Corollary 1: Domestic welfare is maximized when either cost harmonization affects all the foreign firms or none at all.
The exclusion of the middle implies that the welfare impact of cost harmonization is fully examined by comparing welfare at x = 0 and x = n f .
When there are no domestic firms, domestic output is clearly less than half the industry output. Therefore, by (1) the welfare effect of cost harmonization depends on the initial cost gap. This result is related to the finding by Ono (1990) , who analyzes the welfare effect of foreign sales in the oligopolistic domestic market. Treating foreign output as a parameter and assuming that domestic firms play a Cournot game under the residual demand, Ono (1990) shows that domestic welfare reaches its minimum when foreign sales capture exactly 50 percent of total sales in the domestic market. His analysis abstracts from competition between domestic and foreign firms, and hence the effect of foreign cost relative to domestic cost, let alone the implications of cost harmonization, is left unexamined.
We turn to another case often analyzed in the literature (e.g., Qiu and Zhou 2006) .
Case: n d = n -1 > 1 (all firms but one are domestic).
If n d = 1, this case is reduced to the standard duopoly case, which has already been examined, so 7 assume n d ≥ 2. Straightforward computation yields
Suppose that c d < c f . Then, cost harmonization lowers the foreign firm's cost. The cost inequality also implies that q d (0) > q f (0), so W′ (0) < 0. We also have that W′ (1) < 0. Then, lemma 1.B
implies that cost harmonization decreases domestic welfare. This has the following intuitive explanation. Cost harmonization makes the lone foreign firm (whose cost was higher) more efficient. As the foreign firm expands output as a result, all domestic firms contract output. Since domestic firms are more efficient than the foreign firm, their output contraction results in a decrease in domestic welfare. This is similar to the result obtained by Lahiri and Ono (1988) , who have shown that in autarky a slight cost reduction by the most inefficient firms can reduce domestic welfare by causing output contractions of more efficient firms.
We have just shown that cost harmonization induced by falling foreign costs reduces domestic welfare. Then it is tempting to conclude that cost harmonization induced by rising foreign costs must increase domestic welfare. Surprisingly, however, this symmetry in results does not always hold. To see this, note that c d > c f implies that W′ (1) > 0, as can easily be checked. However, it is possible that W′ (0) < 0, that is,
If that is the case, lemma 1.C implies that domestic welfare can still fall. Condition 
Applications
In this section we apply the main findings from section 3 to several cases of cost harmonization that are examined in the recent literature. We begin with cost harmonization that occurs when foreign firms change access modes from exporting to FDI.
4.A. Exporting versus FDI
There is a vast and growing literature comparing exporting and FDI; see, e.g., Markusen (2002) . Although most of this literature focuses on FDI that reduces foreign firms' marginal cost, FDI can result in increases in their marginal cost, as we noted in the introduction. In this subsection we examine both cases of cost harmonization in the common framework by explicitly considering the role fixed and variable cost can play in the foreign firm's decision to choose FDI over exporting. We then examine how home country government policy tools can be used to raise domestic welfare. We conclude this subsection by considering world welfare in this environment. Surprisingly, we are able to show that profitable FDI can make the whole world worse off.
To focus on the issue at hand, consider the duopoly model, with one foreign firm and one domestic firm, which is standard in this literature. As before, the domestic firm's marginal cost of production is c d . In contrast, the foreign firm faces marginal cost c f and fixed cost The foreign firm's profit from exporting is
while its profit from FDI is
The foreign firm then prefers FDI over exporting whenever
As is clear from (4), the foreign firm can prefer FDI even if domestic marginal cost is greater than foreign marginal cost because of the fixed cost difference.
Many governments provide subsidies in order to attract FDI. Such inducements are necessary if foreign firms do not find it profitable to choose FDI over exporting, given cost conditions. In a recent article, Chor (2009) case comprises consumer surplus, the domestic firms profit, and the cost of the subsidy, i.e.,
The derivative at is negative:
Intuitively, domestic welfare falls because (i) a production subsidy results in the cost harmonization when it induces the foreign firm to choose FDI over exporting and (ii) a production subsidy is a drain on national income. Thus, our results contrasts sharply with those from the Dixit-Stiglitz framework (Chor 2009 ).
Proposition 5: Either a fixed or a per-unit subsidy for the foreign duopolist, when it chooses FDI, reduces domestic welfare.
A direct corollary of the above analysis is that a per-unit tax on FDI raises domestic welfare, even if we ignore the tax revenue, because the tax causes dis-harmonization of costs.
From (5), the optimal per-unit tax on FDI production, ignoring the possibility of the foreign firm choosing to export, is computed to be
However, this tax rate may be untenable because at this rate the foreign firm prefers exporting to FDI. In that case, the optimal tax requires that the government lower the tax until the foreign firm is indifferent between exporting and FDI. Denote this tax t′, which is defined by cost is less than domestic fixed cost, in which case the optimal policy is to prevent FDI by setting the tax greater than t′.
We close this subsection by considering the implications of cost harmonizing FDI on world welfare. A standard presumption is that even if domestic welfare is harmed by costharmonizing FDI, the benefit to the foreign firm from choosing FDI should offset the domestic harm, that is, world welfare should increase if FDI is profitable to the foreign firm. Here we show that this presumption can be incorrect, that is, world welfare can be reduced by profitable FDI.
World welfare is defined as the sum of the foreign firm's profit and domestic welfare.
Domestic welfare is harmed when the foreign firm chooses FDI:
The change in world welfare when the foreign firm chooses FDI is .
The first two terms measure the profit gain to the foreign firm when it switches from exporting to FDI; cf (4). If this gain is sufficiently small, (7) is positive since the last term is always positive for all c d ≠ c f . We can now state our result. 
4.B. Other applications
Our results also shed light on the welfare impact of falling transport costs, a quintessence of globalization. To see this, assume there is no FDI and foreign firms export their products initially at cost c f > c d , where the cost difference is due to transport costs. Then ρ is the inverse of transport costs -a measure of globalization, with ρ = 1 indicating the case of complete cost harmonization. Then, W(n f ) -W(0) measures a welfare change caused by lower transport costs.
The implications are straightforward: for example, the domestic country is harmed when the domestic firms have the majority of the market and when transport costs fall (proposition 1).
Our results also have some implications for the strategic trade policy literature. To see this, consider the standard setting, in which one home and one foreign firm compete Cournot fashion in the domestic market. In this setting, the optimal tariff is positive, 2 which implies that trade liberalization or removal of the (optimal) tariffs decreases domestic welfare. While this welfare loss is often attributed to the lost tariff revenues, our analysis shows that domestic welfare falls without the loss of tariff revenues. Since trade liberalization induces cost harmonization, like cost-reducing FDI, all the results from the previous sections apply. If the revenue losses are taken into account, domestic welfare can decrease even if domestic firms are less than 40 percent.
As another application of our results, consider the case in which the domestic country practices "free trade" but the foreign government either taxes or subsidies its firms' exports to the domestic market. Then, our analysis implies that the domestic country is made worse off if the foreign government moves to freer trade by reducing its tax (or subsidy) on its exporters because of the cost harmonization effect such policy changes can bring about.
Concluding remarks
We live in a globalized world. Globalization takes many forms: falling transport cost, limiting export subsidies, switching from exporting to FDI, and coordinating corporate income taxes across countries, to name a few. Many of these changes bring foreign firms ' (marginal) costs closer to those faced by their domestic rivals, a phenomenon which we call cost harmonization. In this paper we consider the welfare implications of cost harmonization between domestic and foreign firms when they compete strategically in the domestic market.
As we emphasized in the text, cost harmonization arises when foreign firms' marginal costs fall, as well as rise, to those facing domestic rivals. The diametrically opposite movements of foreign costs may at first appear to yield the diametrically opposite effect on domestic welfare.
However, our analysis shows that is not always the case. In fact, assuming Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and constant marginal costs, we can identify a number of situations in which cost harmonization can reduce or increase domestic welfare, whether induced by rising or falling foreign costs. Of particular interest is the finding that, when domestic firms produce 40% or more of total industry output, cost harmonization can reduce domestic welfare, regardless of the direction of foreign cost change. We then apply the main results to various cases that have received closer attention in the recent literature, especially, the foreign firms' FDI decisions, and derive policy implications.
